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Re-visiting the rule of law and principle of 
legality: judicial nuisance or licence?
RADLEY HENRICO*
“The fact is that few activities are more in the public domain than adjudicating on the lives of 
our fellow human beings, and few have more public significance than exerting control over the 
government that pays our salary”
**
1  Introduction
A constitutional democracy is required to embrace a discordancy of concerns 
in attempting to attain harmony and toleration of differently tuned instrumental 
values, interests and principles. Daily local and international news editorials testify 
to overreach of public and private power or functions that impacts unlawfully or 
unfairly upon the rights and interests of citizens. Our law reports are replete with 
examples of the latter fact. The proper and lawful exercise of public or private 
power, irrespective of the nature of the functionary, depends essentially on what 
is reasonable. Proportionality and rationality must serve as essential ingredients 
informing reasonableness. Axiomatic to the aforesaid is the role played by the rule of 
law in general and in particular the principle of legality – a necessary incident of the 
rule of law. The purpose of this article is to argue first that the principle of legality, 
employed at its best, offers rich impetus to our administrative law jurisprudence, 
second, that the improper application thereof poses a risk to subverting the principle 
of subsidiarity and, finally, examining the possibility of a commodious balance, if 
any, being struck between the elasticity offered by legality and the requirement of 
not bypassing national legislation.
2  Regne de la loi1
Despite being referred to as “a doctrine deriving from antiquity”,2 the rule of law, 
not unlike the enigma of Mozart’s Requiem,3 continues to brook debate as to its 
precise meaning.4 Section 1(c) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 
*  Senior lecturer in Public and Procedural Law, University of Johannesburg.
**  Sachs The Strange Alchemy of Life and Law (2009) 35.
1 French translation for “rule of law” per Blaau “The Rechtsstaat idea compared with the rule of law 
as a paradigm for protecting rights” 1990 SALJ 76 n 3. 
2 Baxter Administrative Law (1984) 78 and the authorities cited at n 40. 
3 See eg Steen The Lives and Times of the Great Composers (2003) 167-169 and Wade-Matthews and 
Thompson The Encyclopedia of Music (2007) 331. 
4 See eg Walker The Rule of Law: Foundation of Constitutional Democracy (1988) ch 1; Trebilcock 
and Daniels Rule of Law Reform and Development: Charting the Fragile Path of Progress (2008) 
12-37; Sellers and Tomaszewski (eds) The Rule of Law in Comparative Perspective (2010) ch 1, 2 and 
6; Mathews Freedom State Security and the Rule of Law: Dilemmas of the Apartheid Society (1986) 
1-30; Hutchinson “The rule of law revisited: democracy and the courts” in Dyzenhaus Recrafting 
the Rule of Law (1999) 196; Murphy “Lon Fuller and the moral value of the rule of law” 2005 
Law and Philosophy 239; Zywick “The rule of law, freedom, and prosperity” (http://www.law.
gmu.edu/assets/files/publications/working-papers/02-20.pdf) (13-02-2014); Stewart “Men of class: 
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1996 provides: “The Republic of South Africa is one, sovereign, democratic state 
founded on the supremacy of the constitution and the rule of law.”
The definition section5 of the constitution provides no guidance as to what is meant 
by the rule of law. This may be defensible on the basis that the rule of law does not 
of itself rely upon a definition for its purpose or functionality. It may mean different 
things to different people?6 In a state of the union address,7 president Bush referred 
to the rule of law as one of the “non-negotiable demands of human dignity”.8 Of no 
less significance is the observation that the rule of law occupies some special place 
in the “triumph of human rights”.9 The rule of law is also no stranger to globalisation 
and the dynamics of the international arena.10 Capitalism and the rule of law have 
been likened unto “love and marriage”.11 Global administrative law depends for its 
recognition and development on a “body of law which lives up to the ideals of the 
rule of law…”.12
Homage to the rule of law is inexorably linked to the sagacity of Socrates,13 
Plato,14 Aristotle,15 and Cicero.16 Aristotle espoused the rule of law in favour of 
the rule of man17 given the abuse of power and corruption to which the latter is 
susceptible.18 It has been argued that a common denominator to the understanding 
of the rule of law is its purpose or function of protecting people against anarchy; 
allowing people to plan their affairs with confidence and certainty with knowledge 
of what the law requires and sanctions and protecting people from the arbitrary or 
capricious exercise of power wielded by officials.19 Coinage of the phrase “rule of 
law” has been attributed to the nineteenth century lawyer Dicey20 who advocated 
Aristotle, Montesquieu and Dicey on ‘separation of powers’ and ‘the rule of law’” 2004 Macquarie 
Law Journal 9; Heydon “What do we mean by the rule of law” ch1 in Ekins Modern Challenges to 
the Rule of Law (2011) 15-45; and Frank “Democracy, legitimacy, and the rule of law: linkages” in 
Dorsen and Gifford (eds) Democracy and the Rule of Law (2001) 173-174. 
5 s 239. 
6 Stromseth et al Can Might Make Rights? Building the Rule of Law after Military Interventions 
(2007) 58-59.
7 29-01-2002. 
8 Stromseth (n 6) 57. 
9 Stromseth (n 6) 59. 
10 Powel “The role and limits of global administrative law in the security council’s anti-terrorism 
programme” in Corder (ed) Global Administrative Law: Innovation and Development (2009) 32 = 
2009 Acta Juridica 32. 
11 Stromseth (n 6) 58. See also De La Rochère “Fundamental rights in the global and European law 
order” in Anthony et al (eds) Values in Global Administrative Law (2011) 297. 
12 Dyzenhaus “Accountability and the concept of (global) administrative law” in Corder (ed) (n 10) 
10. 
13 Dias Jurisprudence (1976) 80-81.
14 Dias (n 13) 81. See also Gagarin and Cohen (eds) The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Greek Law 
(2005) 405-411. 
15 Fallon “‘The rule of law’ as a concept in constitutional discourse” 1997 Columbia Law Review 1. 
16 Cicero is said to have stated: “Law is the highest reason, implanted in nature, which commands what 
ought to be done and forbids the opposite. … The origin of justice is to be found in law, for law is 
a natural force; it is the mind and reason of the intelligent man, the standard by which justice and 
injustice are measured” Morrison Jurisprudence: From the Greeks to Post-Modernism (2000) 55. 
17 Not unlike Jalil’s reference to: “the liberation of all Libya from the rule of slain leader Muammar 
al-Gaddafi…” The WorldPost (http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/10/23/libya-liberation-
gaddafi_n_1027138html) (10-04-14).
18 Tamanaha On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory (2004) 10. 
19 Fallon (n 15) 7. 
20 Dicey Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (1956) 187; Trebilcock and Daniels (n 
4) 15 n 37; and Walker (n 4) 128-139. Cf Mathews (n 4) 15 n 2 where it is argued that the phrase “rule 
of law” was first used by Hearn in 1876 and subsequently disseminated by Dicey. 
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the supremacy of parliamentary sovereignty based on the rule of law. For Dicey, the 
rule of law comprised certain core values: nobody is above the law – meaning that 
all persons, civilians and government officials alike were equal before the law;21 
no person can suffer punishment save for breaching the law which breach and 
punishment is determinable and imposed respectively by the ordinary courts of the 
land;22 and that a constitution, written or unwritten, is “pervaded by the rule of law” 
given that it is reflective of the judicial pronouncements on “personal liberty” and 
the “rights of persons, in other words, a “judge-made constitution”.23
For Dicey, if the rule of law were to have meaning, its values had to be realised 
in the actual workings of the legal system and not a mere adornment of a written 
constitution.24 South African administrative law has been largely influenced by the 
English Westminster constitutional system incorporative of the Diceyan theory and 
the judicial review of administrative decisions.25 Whilst a legitimate concern about 
Dicey’s theories may have been the protection of citizens against unjust governmental 
interference,26 the overarching concern for Dicey was “parliament’s right to make 
or unmake any law whatever. Moreover, no person or body is recognised by the law 
of England as having a right to override or set aside the legislation of Parliament.”27 
Regrettably, Dicey’s legal positivism, borne out by the principle that judges were 
charged with merely interpreting the will of parliament by stating what the law was 
and not concerning themselves with policy considerations,28 did more to galvanize 
draconian legislation and less to advance the ambit of judicial review of executive 
acts of the political party of the day through the imposition of ouster or privative 
clauses.29 The rule of law, to have meaningful value in a legal system, as allegedly 
contended by Dicey, without the ability of appropriate judicial review, subject to 
reasonable constraints of trias politika,30 was predisposed to being used as a tool for 
endorsing an unjust legal system in which the law of parliament, as regulated by a 
minority electorate,31 could be upheld and applied regardless of consequential moral 
21 Dicey (n 20) 194. 
22 ibid 193. Expressed in the Latin maxim nulla poena sine culpa or nullum crimen sine lege. See 
Hallevey A Modern Treatise on the Principle of Legality in Criminal Law (2010) 8. 
23 Dicey (n 20) 195-196; Sampford Retrospectivity and the Rule of Law (2006) 42-43 and Stewart (n 4) 
11-12; and Mathews (n 4) 16.
24 Sampford (n 23) 44. 
25 Baxter (n 2) 30-32; Hoexter Administrative Law in South Africa (2007) 60-61; and Elliot (ed) 
Administrative Law: Text and Materials (3 ed) 9.
26 See Mathews (n 4) 15-16 where Dicey is criticised for his “liberty of the individual” concern as being 
aligned too closely to “basic civil rights” and not sufficiently liberal to lend expression and support 
to socio-economic and political justiciable rights. For further reading see Stewart (n 4); Dyzenhaus 
(n 12) 190; and Gordon and Bruce “Transformation and the independence of the judiciary in South 
Africa” (http://www.csvr.org.za.docs/transition/3. pdf (2007)) (18-02-2014). 
27 Dicey (n 20) 406-414. Dicey refers to the supremacy of law being of such a nature that it requires 
parliament to be sovereign in the sense that it “no doubt often does give a certain narrowness to 
the judicial construction of statutes. It contributes greatly, however, both … to the authority of the 
judges and to the fixity of the law” (408). See also Stewart “The rule of law and the Tinkerbell effect: 
theoretical considerations, criticisms and justifications for the rule of law” 2004 Macquarie Law 
Journal 7 10. 
28 Hoexter (n 25) 131 and Burns and Beukes Administrative Law under the 1996 Constitution (2006) 
21. 
29 Moseneke “Oliver Schreiner memorial lecture: separation of powers, democratic ethos and judicial 
function” 2008 SAJHR 341 346-347. 
30 For further reading on the doctrine of trias politika see White “Separation of powers and legislative 
supremacy” 2011 Law Quarterly Review 456 464 and Irving “Advisory opinions, the rule of law, and 
the separation of powers” 2004 Macquarie Law Journal 6 11. 
31 Davis “Administrative justice in a democratic South Africa” 2006 Acta Juridica 21 25. 
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considerations.32 Such a system would be anathema to a democratic legal order.33 
Embracing the rule of law in this sense cannot be equated with justice;34 this is “rule 
by law” rather than “rule of law”. Law used to sustain the holocaust, apartheid or a 
system of governance currently manifesting itself in places like Zimbabwe or the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo is fundamentally incompatible with the basic 
principles of freedom, equality and fairness. It is out of kilter with the vibrancy and 
fluidity of law referred to by Hoexter JA in Minister of Justice v Hofmeyr.35 In this 
sense, the rule of law may be steeped in regulations but sorely lacking in justice.36
In Germany, the rule of law has been described as “Rechtsstaat”, readily translated 
into Afrikaans as “regstaat”,37 or “legal state”.38 Rechtsstaat has undergone a 
jurisprudential metamorphosis.39 It proved a dexterous vehicle in advancing the 
repressive powers of Nazi Germany from 1933-1945.40 Today, the rule of law in 
Germany is expressed as the Rechtsstaatsprinzip41 and finds itself enshrined in the 
constitution or basic act of Germany42 which recognises human dignity43 as the most 
fundamental of all rights.44 In Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd v Greater Johannesburg 
Transitional Metropolitan Council45 the court referred to the supreme court of 
Canada46 where it has held: “Simply put, the constitutionalism principle requires 
that all governmental action comply with the Constitution. The rule of law principle 
requires that all government action must comply with the law, including the 
Constitution ….” Kant advocated the idea of Rechtsstaat signifying governmental 
rule based on the exercise of sound reason guaranteeing the fundamental freedom 
of the citizen47 as opposed to a dispensation of governance by means of wielding 
arbitrary power, namely Obrigkeitsstaat.48
32 Corder (n 10) 4-5 and Blaau (n 1) 85. 
33 De Ville “Deference and difference: judicial review and the perfect gift” 2006 Potchefstroom 
Electronic Journal (PER) 17, 32-33 37 and Evans “Deference with a difference: of rights, regulation 
and the judicial role in the administrative state” 2003 SALJ 322 329. 
34 De Ville “The rule of law and judicial review: re-reading Dicey” 2006 Acta Juridica 62 69 ff. 
35 1993 3 SA 131 (A).
36 Murphy (n 4) 260-261 and Tamanaha (n 18) 93. This is not, however, to suggest in any way that the 
principles advocated by Dicey, namely equality and nulla poena sine culpa, do not continue to play 
a helpful and useful role in judicial review. 
37 Blaau (n 1) 76 79-80. 
38 Baxter (n 2) 79. Arguably the term could also refer to “state of justice”, “state of rights”, “state of 
law”, “state of integrity”, “state of conscience” or “state of morality”. 
39 Cornel “Bridging the span toward justice: Laurie Ackerman and the ongoing architectonic of 
dignity” in Barnard-Naude et al (eds) Dignity, Freedom and the Post-Apartheid Legal Order: The 
Critical Jurisprudence of Laurie Ackermann (2008) 19 and 2008 Acta Juridica 19. 
40 Dyson The State Tradition in Western Europe (1980) 36. 
41 Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council 1999 1 SA 
374 (CC) par 56. 
42 a 20(3) Grundgesetz. 
43 For a contention equating human dignity to the Grundnorm of the totality of all other values, 
especially equality, see Wood “Human dignity, right and the realm of ends” in Barnard-Naude (n 39) 
47-65. 
44 Tamanaha (n 18) 108-109, 113. 
45 (n 41) par 56.
46 In The Matter of a Reference by the Government in Council Concerning Certain Questions Relating 
to the Secession of Quebec from Canada 53. 
47 Eberle “The German idea of freedom” 2008 Oregan Review of International Law 19 n 37 and 49. 
See also Kuzmicz “The Kantian model of the state under the rule of law” 2009 Studies in Logic, 
Grammar and Rhetoric 13 26. 
48 German translation for authoritarian state per Kjaer “Constitutionalism in the global realm: a 
sociological approach” (http://weblaw.haifa.ac.il/he/Events/evefile/ConstitutionalismKjaer.pdf) 
(11-04-14).
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Requiring government action to comply with the law inclusive of the constitutional 
prerequisites appears somewhat tautological. However, the law as referred to in the 
Fedsure case, is, it is submitted, law in the notional, open-ended sense embracive 
of, yet not limited to, the judiciary taking an informed and collective account49 of 
all fundamental values and norms of a legal system that informs the fairness and 
justice aspects of law and not merely the positivistic aspect of law expressing and 
asserting law for the sake of law per se. What bodes well for the posterity of future 
jurisprudential development has been the ongoing recognition our courts have 
accredited to the invaluable role of the rule of law in our constitutional democracy.50
Whilst Hobbes and Locke advocate the rule of law as a means to “govern the 
governors”,51 Fuller asserts that the rule of law comprises moral values that inform 
the way in which a legal system is optimally politically governed.52 For Raz, the 
importance of the rule of law rests on the extent to which subjects obey the law 
and legal enforcement mechanisms available to the state. It is easier for law to be 
understood and serve as a guide and thereby be obeyed if it is seen for what it is, 
namely the law, as opposed to legal rules imbued with moral values.53 As such, the 
rule of law can serve as much a virtuous as a malevolent purpose.54 The inexorable 
link between morals and law is such that the rule of law for Dyzenhaus imposes an 
ethical and principled duty on judges to reject openly any law – even one passed 
by parliament – which is an affront to the underpinning principles and values of 
the common law of a legal system.55 This is important on account of the fact that 
in a constitutional dispensation – according to Dyzenhaus - individuals must be 
protected from “arbitrary action by the state”.56 Dworkin argued that the rule of 
law is consistent with “intellectual” as opposed to “political discipline” in which 
we constantly strike, as best we can, a balance between law being grounded on 
integrity, consequently translating into the imperative that judges should merely act 
with greater integrity57 and inherently underscoring the power of judicial review. For 
the past twenty years of our democracy our law reports are testimony to a judiciary 
capable of delivering the necessary principled judicial reasoning that invokes the 
rule of law for the realisation of civilian rights58 in a constitutional democracy. 
49 See Reeves “Judicial practical reason: judges in morally imperfect legal orders” 2011 Law and 
Philosophy 319 334 and Mikva “The need for an independent judiciary: implications for South 
African reform” (http://www.avilr.org/pdf/8/8-23-23-23.pdf) (21-02-2014). 
50 See Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA: in re ex parte President of the RSA 2000 2 
SA 674 (CC) par 17, 35, 40 and 85; Zondi v MEC for Traditional and Local Government Affairs 2005 
3 SA 589 (CC) par 62 and AAA Investments (Pty) Ltd v Micro Finance Regulatory Council 2006 11 
BCLR 1255 (CC) par 29. 
51 Rodriguez et al “The rule of law unplugged” (http:///www.law.emary.edu/fileadmin/journals/
elj/59/59.6/McCubbinsRodriguez_Weingast.pdf) (21-02-2014) 1457. 
52 Murphy (n 4) 242-243. Cf Luban “The rule of law and human dignity: re-examining Fuller’s canons” 
2010 Georgetown Law: Faculty Publications (http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/369) 
(22-02-2014). 
53 Murphy (n 4) 246-247.
54 Luban (n 52) 9-10. 
55 Murphy (n 4) 259; Dyzenhaus (n 12) 2-3; and De Ville (n 33) 10-11.
56 Criddle “Mending holes in the rule of (administrative) law” 2010 Northwestern University Law 
Review 1271 1273.
57 Dworkin Freedom’s Law (1999) 82-83. 
58 See President of the RSA v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2005 5 SA 3 (CC) par 39-40; Minister of 
Public Works v Kyalami Ridge Environmental Association 2001 3 SA 1151 (CC) par 33-34 and par 
114; Police and Prisons Civil Rights Union v Minister of Correctional Services 2006 2 All SA 175 
(E) par 78; Joseph v City of Johannesburg 2010 4 SA 55 (CC) par 25 and 43; and the Zondi case (n 
50) par 58-64. 
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A delineation must be made between Rechtsstaat as borne out in a constitutional 
state wherein the exercise of governmental power is constrained by the law and 
mere emphasis placed on what is just in terms of ethics, morality, righteousness or 
principles of rationality as viewed through the lens of the Anglo-American tradition 
of the rule of law.59
The constitution provides that the judicial authority of the Republic is vested in 
the courts that are independent and subject only to the constitution and the law which 
they must apply impartially and without fear, favour or prejudice.60 Underscoring the 
independence of the judiciary is the oath or solemn affirmation of judicial officers61 
in terms of which it is sworn or affirmed to “uphold and protect the Constitution and 
the human rights entrenched in it”.62 An attempt at reaching a decision sustained by 
relevant value-laden principles which does not usurp the functions of the other two 
democratically elected arms of government calls for a balance to be struck by means 
of the principle of proportionality as articulated by Beatty who states that:
“Making proportionality the critical test of whether a law or some other act of state is constitutional 
or not separates the powers of the judiciary and the elected branches of government in a way that 
provides a solution to the paradox that has confounded constitutional democracy for so long.”
63
By adopting such a test, due regard is had not only to deferring to the doctrine of 
trias politika but also to the fact that proportionality proximates an approach to 
arriving at a decision that is neutral insofar as it is able to give effect to constitutional 
imperatives with regard to notions of “rationality” (legitimacy) and “necessity” 
which are the constituent parts of proportionality.64 Stripped to its simplest form, 
it is a test in terms of which a law will not be countenanced if it cannot pass 
muster by lacking in legitimate reason(s) and hence cannot be justified and would 
also be lacking in necessity where to impose same would cause an unwarranted 
“infringement of a person’s constitutional rights”. Hence, such a test would ensure 
that government would need compelling and strong reasons for decisions or the 
exercise of public power or functions imposing irrational or unnecessary burdens 
on the rights of individuals.65
The judiciary, has been pointed out by former state president Mandela, as a solitary 
forum in South Africa where the rule of law applies.66 Mandela defines this law as 
one which is inclusive of equal protection of all groups of society with the purpose 
of establishing an intact united South Africa.67 In contrast, president Zuma whilst 
addressing a joint sitting of parliament bidding farewell to former chief justice Ngcobo 
stated: “The powers conferred on the courts cannot be regarded as superior to the 
59 See Gosalbo-Bono “The significance of the rule of law and its implications for the European Union 
and the United States” 2010 University of Pittsburgh Law Review 229 274-278. See also Ohnesorge 
“The rule of law” 2007 Annual Review of Law, Society and Science 99 101-102; Rosenfield “The rule 
of law and the legitimacy of constitutional democracy” 2001 Southern California Law Review 1307 
1314 and 1318-1329; and Chesterman “An international rule of law” (http://www.iilg.org.research/
documents/chesterman.aninternationalruleoflaw.draftarticle.pdf) (10-04-14). 
60 s 165(1). 
61 the constitution sch 2, item 6. 
62 item 6(1).
63 Beatty The Ultimate Rule of Law (2005) 160 ff. 
64 Beatty (n 63) 163.
65 Beatty (n 63) 164-165. 
66 Fitzpatrick “‘The new constitutionalism’: the global, postcolonial and the constitution of nations” 
2006 Law, Democracy and Development 1 5. 
67 Fitzpatrick (n 66) 5. See also Mandela Long Walk to Freedom: The Autobiography of Nelson Mandela 
(1995) 1-3.
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powers resulting from a mandate given [to the executive] by the people in a popular 
vote.”68 In a divergent view, a parliamentary representative for the Cope, Lekota, has 
been resolute in referring to the judgments handed down by the constitutional court, 
albeit against the government,69 as evidence of “South African democracy at work” 
in a system in which a law which is not aligned to the constitution will be declared 
invalid irrespective of the frustration thereof for government.70
Kaleidoscopic descriptions of the rule of law flout the possibility of its meaning or 
concept being consigned to any rigid juridical boundaries of a universal definition. 
It would seem that the meaning and concept of the rule of law is more likely to be 
conceived of by its absence than presence. That the rule of law plays a meaningful 
and pivotal role in our constitutional democracy has been aptly described:
“Whenever power and naked self-interest can prevail against reason and the common good, the 
rule of law is not complete. Government will always be needed to protect liberty against aggression 
and to secure the many social goods that require large-scale collective action, but the rule of law 
constrains those in power to the purposes that justify their authority… but no one can deny that 
every departure from the rule of law is a denial of justice. The ultimate goal of every society and 
every legal system should be equal and impartial justice for all. Imperia legum potentiora quam 
hominum esto.”
71
One accentuating of this description articulated by Paton is that “[t]he Rule of Law 
is the greatest political achievement of humankind. The Rule of Law is a miracle; it 
is nothing less than man protecting himself against his own cruelty.”72
A fortiori the rule of law must have meaning and significance for the way in which 
civilians in society are protected against the potential disproportionate exercise of 
governmental power that unfairly and illegally impinges the rights and liberties of 
persons in a constitutional democracy.
On the other hand, can it be taken for what it purports to be – governance by law, 
alternatively – regulation by law, further alternatively – the power of law? Precisely 
what constitutes the rule of law continues to be the focus of much jurisprudential 
debate.73 What significance, if any, ought to be attached to the preposition “of”, as 
opposed to the counter-preposition “by” as the nexus between “rule” and “law? It is 
submitted that the meaning of the rule of law underscores the argument made in this 
article, namely that the rule of law, as purpose and function, must be infused and 
instilled with inherently fundamental moral values to play any meaningful role in 
a constitutional democracy.74 A government in which private and public affairs are 
conducted consistent with a common understanding of what is morally, reasonably 
and lawfully justified rings true of the rule of law. Since “law is not a static thing. 
68 See “Executive superior to courts, says Zuma” Business Day (2-11-2011) 1. Cf counter-argument 
raised by opposition Democratic Alliance parliamentary leader Mazibuko that the constitution was 
drafted to “limit power abuse” and prevent a “recurrence of tyranny” by making sure that “the law 
would never again be used by the strong to oppress the weak”. 
69 With reference to the Glenister challenge to the abolition of the Scorpions and opposition to the 
attempt by Zuma to reappoint Ngcobe CJ. 
70 Business Day (n 68). 
71 The powerful superior principle of the law is there for all persons, Sellers and Tomaszewski (n 4) 9. 
72 Abel “Law under stress: the struggle against apartheid in South Africa, 1980-1994, and the defence 
of legality in the United States after 9/11” 2010 SAJHR 217 218 n 3. 
73 See, in general: Penner et al (eds) Introduction to Jurisprudence and Legal Theory: Commentary 
and Materials (2005); Freeman Lloyd’s Introduction to Jurisprudence (2008) 33-44 and 386; Adams 
Philosophical Problems in the Law (2000) 46-69 75-90; and Coleman and Shapiro (eds) The Oxford 
Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law (2002) 206 268 ff. 
74 Hampton “Democracy and the rule of law” in Shapiro (ed) The Rule of Law (1994) 32-38. 
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It is forever changing and being adapted to novel conditions”,75 we must expect 
nothing less of the rule of law. The change we seek is an organically evolutionary 
legal change addressing the adaptions of a non-static society.76
Rational societal communities77 organize themselves in a manner conducive 
to advancing personal, cultural, social, economic and political interests within 
parameters set by morally acceptable laws. A legal order is thereby established, 
netted by the principle that respect for the law is entrenched in a fundamental 
reasoning, common to members of such communities that law is something “which 
commands what should be done and forbids the contrary”.78 The full extent and 
purport of the laws to which they are subject may generally go unnoticed since 
the corpus of law roping together the socio-economic and political threads of 
society are at times as innately commonplace as oxygen inadvertently inhaled.79 
Difficulties arise, however, when we find that the oxygen we so readily rely upon 
suddenly diminishes in quality or vanishes in toto.80 Put differently, the importance 
of what was once vital to us as the rule of law81 is only grasped upon realisation of 
its diminution82 or absence.83 A system of government84 depends for its integrity and 
legitimacy on the rule of law.85
75 Hoexter JA in the Hofmeyr case (n 35) 157D. 
76 See Sypnowich “Utopia and the rule of law” in Dyzenhaus Recrafting the Rule of Law: The Limits of 
Legal Order (1999) 179-180.
77 West “Cicero’s teaching on natural law” (http://www.vindicatingthefounders.com/author/cicero.
pdf) (25-02-2014). 
78 Van Zyl Cicero’s Legal Philosophy (1986) 43. See also Tamanaha (n 18) 92 and Hampton (n 74) 41. 
79 Obvious exceptions come to mind such as clamant calls from public interest groups for 
environmentally-friendly legislation. See “Special report: Heroes of the environment” in Time 
International (5-10-2009) 53-78 and “Wasting our watts” in Time International (12-01-2009) 20-24. 
Alternatively concerns over the use of torture as a means of interrogation. See “How to make 
terrorists talk” in Time International (8-06-2009) 25-27. 
80 Ewald “Norms, discipline and the law” in Golder and Fitzpatrick (eds) Foucalt and the Law (2010) 
125 ff. 
81 Corder “Crowbars and cobwebs: executive autocracy and the law in South Africa” 1989 SAJHR 1 
2. 
82 It has been correctly argued how “South Africa [after the National Party took power in 1948] had 
long proclaimed fidelity to the law” against the somewhat less felicitous reality of parliamentary 
sovereignty wherein repressive and unfairly discriminatory laws were passed; judicial appointments 
were predominantly weighted in favour of the ruling party and the period of the 1980s saw the 
greatest increase of hostilities between human rights advocates and government. See Abel “Legality 
without a constitution: South Africa in the 1980s” in Dyzenhaus (n 12) 68-69; Mathews (n 4) 62-97; 
192 ff; and 219-268; Hoexter “The principle of legality in South African administrative law” 2004 
Macquarie Law Journal 165 167-169 (http://www.law.mq.edu.au/html/MqLJ/volume4…) (25-02-
2014); Hoexter “Administrative justice and dishonesty” 1994 SALJ 700 713 and O’Regan “Breaking 
ground: some thoughts on the seismic shift in our administrative law” 2004 SALJ 424 429. 
83 A practical example is the plight of modern day countries propelled into a state of chaos through 
political unrest, terrorism, economic turmoil and human rights atrocities where clearly lawlessness 
prevails such as Pakistan, see “The nation that failed itself” in Times International (25-05-2009) 
10-15. Other examples are the crises in countries such as Sierra Leone, Afghanistan or East Timor. 
See Stromseth (n 6) 249. 
84 Meaning “government” in the sense ascribed to it by Baxter (n 2) 96 as “the activity of governing 
and the institutions which perform that activity”. 
85 Pursuant to the demise of former Libyan leader, Gaddafi, Libya’s transitional leader, Jalil has urged 
the people of Libya to embrace a spirit of reconciliation and forgiveness and stated: “There are 
properties and lands that were illegally seized (under Gadaffi). Let law be our judge to resolve these 
issues.” See “Liberation of Libya proclaimed as world demands answers” The Star (17-10-2011) 4. 
The recent appointment by Zuma of a commission of enquiry into the arms deal debacle has been 
commended by public protector, Madonsela, as evidence of Zuma’s “highest office in the land’s 
respect for the rule of law”. See 0289 Legalbrief Forensic (27-10-2011). 
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Overseeing the system of the exercise and functions of public and private power 
in our legal system is section 33 of the constitution86 as read with the Promotion of 
Administrative Justice Act (PAJA).87 Its enshrinement in the constitution is also 
consistent with international law. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights88 
declares “that human rights should be protected by the rule of law”.89 Quintessential 
elements of the rule of law are located in the European Convention on Human Rights,90 
the Freedom Charter91 which states that our country will never be prosperous or free 
until all our people live on brotherhood, enjoying equal rights and opportunities and 
the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights.92 The International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights93 considers that “in accordance with the principles 
proclaimed in the charter of the United Nations, recognition of the inherent dignity 
and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation 
of freedom, justice and peace in the world”.94 whilst the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights95 echoes the aforesaid wording of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights96 and also refers to the principle 
of mutual benefit of international law.97 Moreover, the European Convention on the 
Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations98 has a generic provision, in instances 
where specific governing law has not been chosen, that states “the contract shall 
be governed by the law of the country with which it is most closely connected”.99 
In recognition of globalization influences the International Labour Declaration on 
Social Justice for Fair Globalisation100 (the declaration) states that “the fundamental 
values of freedom, human dignity, social justice, security and non-discrimination 
are essential for sustainable economic and social development and efficiency”.101
3  The principle of legality
The court in the Fedsure case102 referred to the principle of legality as a fundamental 
principle of constitutional law.103 The principle, it explained, was premised on the 
notion that the legislature and executive “in every sphere” are constrained by the 
86 Which provides for “just administrative action”. 
87 3 of 2000, its aim is to give effect to the right to administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and 
procedurally fair. See Currie The Promotion of Administrative Justice Act: A Commentary (2007).
88 10-12-1948. 
89 A two-fold noteworthy aspect of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is its preambulatory 
express recognition that “the inherent dignity and … equal and inalienable rights of all members of 
the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world” as well as the fact that 
“faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person and in the equal 








96 also in its preamble. 




101 the declaration 7. 
102 n 41. 
103 par 68.
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principle that they may exercise no more power than that which has been conferred 
upon them by law.104 To exercise more power than what has been conferred in terms 
of the law would be ultra vires. The latter doctrine was a common-law ground of 
review in administrative law in our pre-constitutional dispensation.105 However, the 
constitutional dispensation subsequently adopted former common-law grounds of 
review leaving the common law to inform the relevant provisions of the Promotion 
of Administrative Justice Act and the constitution106 as it is developed on a casuistic 
basis in respect of administrative107 and other areas of our law respectively.108
Even where power does not constitute administrative action, to the extent that the 
exercise thereof arises from the constitution, the court in President of the RSA v South 
African Rugby Football Union109 (SARFU) stated that such power is constrained 
by the principle of legality.110 It is seen as an implicit part of the constitution.111 
Significantly, the court pointed out that powers constrained by the principle of 
legality arise from provisions of the constitution other than the administrative 
justice clause and went on to point out that whereas in the pre-constitutional era 
the prime constraint on the exercise of power was in terms of what was provided by 
administrative law, powers can now be constrained “throughout the constitution” by 
the principle of legality in addition to the right to just administrative action.112 In the 
Pharmaceutical113 matter, and with reference to what had been stated in the Fedsure 
and SARFU cases, the constitutional court affirmed the constitutional control and 
restraint that flowed from the principle of legality.114 As Chaskalson P stated: “The 
exercise of all public power must comply with the Constitution, which is the supreme 
law, and the doctrine of legality, which is part of that law”115 and “[w]hat would 
have been ultra vires under the common law by reason of a functionary exceeding 
a statutory power is invalid under the Constitution according to the doctrine of 
legality.”116
We no longer have the common law as well as a constitutional law system for 
purposes of determining the exercise and constraints of public and private power. 
However, with reference to the constitution itself it would appear that the exercise 
of such power falls to be gauged by the express provisions of the rule of law 
which is a foundational value of the constitution117 in addition to an over-arching 
imperative flowing therefrom, namely the principle of legality. If the rule of law is 
an express requirement and the principle of legality an implicit essentiale thereof 
then fundamentally the lowermost of enquiries should be whether the exercise of 
104 par 58. 
105 Hoexter (n 82) 116 and Baxter (n 2) 301-304. 
106 Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs 2004 4 SA 490 (CC) par 22. See also 
Devenish et al Administrative Law and Justice in South Africa (2001) 36-37 and 50-55. 
107 See the Zondi case (n 50) par 99. 
108 See Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security 2001 4 SA 938 (CC) par 54; Barkhuizen v Napier 
2007 5 SA 323 (CC) par 29 and Mozart Ice Cream Franchises (Pty) Ltd v Davidoff 2009 3 SA 78 (C) 
85C-H. 
109 2000 1 SA 1 (CC). 
110 par 148.
111 par 148. 
112 par 148. 
113 (n 50).
114 par 17.
115 par 20. See also Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development v Chonco 2010 4 SA 82 (CC) 
par 27.
116 par 50.
117 par 17. See also O’Regan (n 82) 434. 
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public or private power118 is consistent with the principle of legality. In point of fact, 
administrative law in South Africa has always been characterised by the notion that 
administrative tribunals are subject to the principle of legality to be determined by 
the ordinary courts of our land.119 For actions of power, which have the effect of 
compromising rights and interests of others, to be legal (legitimate) they must be 
exercised in accordance with valid law.120
The constitutional principle of legality functions as a fount of basic norms 
informing the regulation of all public power, administrative and non-administrative 
and thereby gives expression to the non-administrative provisions121 and specifically 
the administrative action provision122 of our constitution.123 In Minister of Health v 
New Clicks SA (Pty) Ltd,124 Chaskalson CJ was explicit in stating that a litigant was 
not at liberty to side-step the provisions of the Promotion of Administrative Justice 
Act and rely directly on section 33(1) of the constitution or the common law.125 The 
rationale appears expressly from the preamble to the Promotion of Administrative 
Justice Act, namely “to give effect to” the right to administrative action that is 
lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair since section 33(1) is not self-executing.126 
Not dissimilar reasoning appears in SANDU v Minister of Defence127 wherein the 
court made it clear that litigants could not rely on the constitution to seek to enforce 
labour rights where such rights already existed in terms of the Labour Relations 
Act.128 The right for an employee to seek a remedy against an employer for an alleged 
unfair labour practice is confined to a closed list of unfair labour practices under 
the act.129 Significantly, and in a somewhat unfair vein, the employer is given no 
remedy to proceed against an employee who by way of action or omission commits 
an unfair labour practice. However, section 23 of the constitution provides that 
everyone is entitled to fair labour practices. To allow an employer the right to pursue 
a claim of unfair labour practice against an employee by relying on section 23 must 
surely be permitted as being consistent with the ethos underlining section 34 of the 
constitution, not to mention the right to equal treatment. Even where the Labour 
Relations Act does provide a spring-board for the pursuit of litigants’ rights, legal 
precedent130 has shown that due to the inherent constraints of the wording of the act, 
litigants have instead resorted to relying on section 23 of the constitution. Section 
23 has had to be relied upon for the simple reason that the restrictive and narrow 
statutory provisions of the act fail “to give effect to” the realisation of rights.
118 See the AAA Investments case (n 50) and the authorities cited therein. 
119 Barrie “The state administrative tribunal of Western Australia: an example to follow?” 2010 South 
African Public Law 630 632. 
120 Blaau (n 1) 83. 
121 eg s 8(1), 9, 10, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27 and 34. 
122 s 33.
123 Hoexter (n 82 (2004)) 183. 
124 2006 2 SA 311 (CC).
125 par 96. 
126 Asinow “Toward a South African Administrative Justice Act” 1998 Michigan Journal of Race and 
Law 1 and Devenish (n 106) 142-143.
127 1999 6 BCLR 615 (CC).
128 66 of 1995. 
129 s 186(2)(a)-(d). See also Schoeman v Samsung Electronics SA (Pty) Ltd 1997 10 BLLR 1364. 
130 In this regard, see Murray v Minister of Defence 2008 11 BCLR 1175 (SCA) where in dealing with a 
matter of constructive dismissal, although catered for in terms of s 186(1)( f ) of the LRA, Cameron 
JA stated that all contracts (falling within and outside the ambit of the LRA) are still subject to 
constitutional scrutiny since the law and the constitution impose certain obligations, especially the 
right to “fair treatment in the workplace”. See par 8-10; Discovery Health Ltd v CCMA 2008 7 BLLR 
633 (LC) and Kylie v CCMA 2010 4 SA 383 (LAC). 
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Conceptual difficulties and intricacies of the Promotion of Administrative Justice 
Act131 do more to obfuscate than inspire an action in terms of the Promotion of 
Administrative Justice Act for judicial review of administrative action and the basic 
protection sought against the invalid exercise of power. Dealing with administrative 
law in the context of constitutional considerations as read with the Promotion of 
Administrative Justice Act is no easy task, regard being had of the complex and 
convoluted definition of administrative action.132 Practical impediments encountered 
by citizens, legal practitioners, academics and our courts in having to grapple with 
the juristic muddle of the intricacies of the act133 foisted upon administrative law 
and the mere exercise of public power has been slated as follows: “If the misfortunes 
of [PAJA] were set to music it would have to be the blues. Close your eyes and you 
might hear, for an instant, the late great John Lee Hooker sing his unforgettable ‘I’ll 
never get out of these PAJA blues alive’.”134
How do we get out of these the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act blues 
alive? It is correct, as pointed out by Chaskalson CJ in the New Clicks case135 that 
the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act addresses, in codified form, the issues 
of lawfulness (legality), reasonableness, procedural fairness and the providing 
of reasons in administrative action under review. Nevertheless, a hurdle to cross 
before examining the aforesaid requirements is the onus on a litigant of proving 
what constitutes administrative action as prescribed in terms of the definition of 
s 1 of the act.136 In concurring with Chaskalson CJ, Ngcobo J dispels any notion 
of the development of “two parallel systems of law” in a scenario where national 
legislation such as the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act had been enacted 
“to give effect to” the constitutional right to just administrative action. In the event, 
a litigant has no alternative but to found an action based on the act.137
A novel-tuned approach is forthcoming from Sachs J. Whilst arguing for a more 
expansive reading of section 33 and agreeing that the act cannot simply be side-
stepped,138 Sachs J advances the argument of approaching the issue of dealing with 
administrative and regulative bodies exercising public power with reference to 
the act and section 33 as the “micro-management of public power”139 due to their 
formalistic focus, whereas the principle of legality operates in a constitutional 
democracy “at the macro level”140 having as its purpose and aim “to ensure that 
the processes of rule-making are consistent with the way public power should be 
articulated in an open and democratic society envisaged by the Constitution”.141 
Sachs J levels criticism against the act being the commencement point of the 
enquiry, saying that whilst the act may provide a refined mechanism, “it cannot 
define” what section 33 envisages. Thus section 33 should be the starting point of 
131 See remarks by Moseneke J in the New Clicks case (n 124) par 719-724 and especially the authorities 
cited at n 489. 
132 O’Regan (n 82) 437. 
133 Assented to on 3-02-2000 and placed into commencement on 30-11-2000. 
134 Currie “What difference does the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act make to administrative 
law?” 2006 Acta Juridica 325. 
135 par 143.
136 par 132.
137 par 436-438. Ngcobo J (par 437) does point out the exception where the statute in question is deficient 
in the remedies provided. 
138 In itself this is indicative of Sachs J’s deference to judicial precedent, one of the ingredients to the 
rule of law. 
139 par 583.
140 par 583.
141 par 583. 
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the analysis in assessing the “overall manner in which the constitution deals with 
the functioning of public administration”.142 In finding that neither section 33 nor the 
act applied to the general regulatory scheme relating to the pricing system for the 
sale of medicines by the minister of health, which constituted the judicial review of 
subordinate legislation, Sachs J reasoned that the scheme was nevertheless subject 
to judicial review in terms of the principle of legality.143 To this end, Sachs J states:
“Legality … draws its life-blood from multiple texts of the Constitution and lies at the structural 
heart of our constitutional democracy….
144
 Legality [moreover] is an evolving concept in our 
jurisprudence, whose full creative potential will be developed in a context-driven and incremental 
manner.”
145
Clearly, section 33 and the act have self-imposing measures of restriction in terms of 
which the exercise of power constitutes administrative action. The greater concern 
is not always whether the act in question is administrative, but rather the extent to 
which the public or private power being exercised violates rights in terms of the bill 
of rights, even where such power may not be formally designated “administrative 
action” for purposes of the act or section 33.146 The principle of legality is instrumental 
in addressing such lacunae.
It is submitted that to argue for the repeal of the act for want of lack of complying 
with section 172 of the constitution for its failure “to give effect to” section 33(1) 
or simply to amend the act to be more user-friendly would be far-fetched and 
unrealistic. Currently the act is the only gateway for purposes of judicial review of 
administrative action. Posed, yet unanswered in the Fedsure case, was the question 
whether the rule of law has greater content than the principle of legality.147
Observance of the rule of law forms part of the impasse; the Promotion of 
Administrative Justice Act is too confined and restrictive to lend itself as a rich 
interpretive tool to be used by our courts to regulate the exercise of public power.148 
A constitutional democracy based on human dignity, equality and freedom is as 
much reliant on the rule of law as it is on the principle of legality. Legality may not 
be expressly stated in our constitution as the rule of law is per section 1(c) yet its 
intrinsic nexus to the rule of law makes it an imperative crammed with values that 
must be drawn upon in order to determine the legitimacy and propriety of the exercise 
of power on the part of the executive and legislature. The conceptual distinctiveness 
between the rule of law and principle of legality is not an impediment to them 
operating as a duet in which they share a jurisprudential symbiotic relationship, the 
one sustaining the other as a means from which to make informative and balanced 
decisions, balanced in the sense that they are both reasonable and proportional.149
142 par 587.
143 par 612. Moseneke J, notwithstanding acknowledging the debate pertaining to PAJA and s 33 (n 
126) assumes in favour of PAJA being applicable (par 671). Madala J, Mokgoro J, Skweyiya J and 
Jacoob J (in a separate judgment from par 792-841) concur in the judgment of Moseneke J. Langa 
DCJ concurs with Chaskalson CJ and Ngcobo J (par 842). O’Regan J concurs in the main with 
Chaskalson CJ’s reasoning (par 846) and Van der Westhuizen J concurs with the conclusion of 
Ngcobo J that PAJA applies (par 851).
144 508A. 
145 par 614.
146 Relevant cases in this regard are: President of the Republic of South Africa v Hugo 1997 4 SA 1 (CC); 
the Pharmaceutical case (n 50); and the SARFU case (n 109). 
147 par 58.
148 An example is Sachs J having to rely on the principle of legality in the New Clicks case as a means 
of justifying review of subordinate delegated legislation. 
149 Hoexter (n 25) 184.
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As to its content, the legality aspect of the rule of law, according to Fuller, is said 
to be “a notion central to the very concept of the legal order” and is given a pivotal 
role to play in the lives of lawyers and judges alike.150 Compelling considerations 
of political morality are also to be taken into account.151 A noteworthy distinction 
between the rule of law and principle of legality is that the latter, as a result of 
its inherent implicitness, can be employed as a flexible tool to address unwieldy 
and cumbersome complexities, such as where we may encounter the chasm in our 
law pointed out by Sachs J in the New Clicks case.152 Difficult cases court difficult 
decisions. In the absence of being able to rely on the trusted instruments of the rule 
of law in finding an appropriate means of arriving at a suitable decision, there is no 
reason why the principle of legality cannot function as a panacea. To this end, and 
for reasons articulated below, legality has greater content than the rule of law.
When summoned by Du Plessis J to give evidence in his capacity as state 
president,153 Mandela explained his actions as:
“symbolic and important because it underscored the rule of law and the principle that all are equal 
before the law. He also explained that it is the Constitution that requires of all of us to obey, respect 
and support courts, not because judges are important or entitled to some special deference but 
because the institution they serve in has been chosen by us collectively, in order to protect the very 
vital interests of all and in particular those who are likely to fall foul of wielders of public or private 
power.”
154
The institution referred to is the judiciary. Entrusting the maintenance and 
functioning of a system to a judge wherein human dignity, equality and freedom 
is upheld against the exercise of political machinations of the government gives 
expression to how Sypnowich refers to Locke’s insistence of the role to be played 
by the judiciary when referring to the advantage to society of having “established, 
settled, known law, applied by a judge who is both “known and indifferent”, who 
does not produce judgments that are “varied in particular cases, but to have one rule 
for the rich and poor, for the favourite at court, and the country man at plough”.155
Anathema to the notion of democracy for some is the idea that the judicial arm 
of government is given power to regulate the powers of the duly elected arms of 
government.156 Our constitutional dispensation weighs in equal balance the need 
to “lay the foundations for a democratic society based on the will of the people” as 
it does the fact that “the people and every citizen is equally protected by law”.157 
The equilibrium to be struck is how to respect the will of the people by permitting 
their duly elected political representatives from executing their functions under the 
auspices of parliament and the executive and at the same time protecting the same 
persons, or unrepresented or minority citizens of our society from the exercise of 
power of such institutions that may prove or show themselves to be inimical and 
self-serving.
Such balance is achieved in general by the rule of law through the relative 
application of the doctrine of trias politica. For reasons already mentioned, the 
principle of legality is also required to be invoked. That the legality with regard to 
150 Mathews (n 4) 298. 
151 Reeves (n 49) 336 and Dworkin (n 57) 103. 
152 par 580. 
153 the SARFU case (n 109).
154 Moseneke (n 29) 352. 
155 Sypnowich (n 76) 181 n 4. 
156 Raina (ed) AV Dicey: General Characteristics of English Constitutionalism (2009) 12-13 74 ff. 
157 preamble to the constitution. 
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the executive and legislative powers, as determined against the bill of rights, would 
be negated should the doctrine of separation of powers not be upheld, was recognised 
by Chaskalson P in SA Association of Personal Injury Lawyers v Heath.158 It is the 
task of the courts to “ensure that the limits to the exercise of public power are not 
transgressed”.159 The essentialia of administrative law, as expressed by Chaskalson 
P in the Pharmaceutical case are, after all, “an incident of the separation of powers 
under which courts regulate and control the exercise of public power by the other 
branches of government”.160 Dealing with how the courts, in executing their tasks 
of judicial review, should treat the decisions made by government with respect, 
O’Regan J in the Bato Star Fishing case confirmed that such respect was premised 
on trias politica161 and went on to say that a court should not merely “rubber-stamp 
an unreasonable decision”162 but determine the reasonableness thereof in terms of 
certain listed factors.163 In our constitutional democracy the doctrine of separation 
of powers has to be upheld as an integral aspect of the rule of law. However, the 
extent of its application is relative and not absolute.164 As integral as trias politica is 
to the rule of law is the principle of legality. As such, if our courts are given power 
to regulate all forms of power by a judicious ease of the doctrine of separation 
of powers and apply the principle of legality to inform their reasoning as to the 
propriety of the exercise of such power, it is submitted that the principle of legality 
is sufficiently flexible to inform the reasoning of courts as to how far they can and 
ought to be permitted to regulate the exercise of power. Conversely, legality imposes 
self-restraining principles upon a court and the exercise of its discretion.
Goldstone J, in delivering a lecture,165 referred to the prescient remarks made in 
a previous lecture by Corbett CJ on “guaranteeing fundamental freedoms in a new 
South Africa” that:
“A justiciable bill of rights provides no infallible guarantee that human rights will be respected or that, 
if infringed, the infringement will be addressed. It all depends on the attitude of the people. If they 
accept the concept of human rights and their enforcement by the courts and if all those in positions 
of power, legislators, government executives, administrators, are willing to bow to the superior 
authority in this sphere of the courts, that is, if the courts enjoy the power of legitimacy…”
166
If the judiciary is the ultimate guardian167 of the constitution to ensure neither of 
the other two branches of government flout any constitutional imperatives, surely 
this must be taken to be the “hope” which is provided to all people of South Africa 
158 2001 1 SA 883 (CC) par 26. 
159 par 25.
160 (n 50) par 45. 
161 (n 106) par 46. 
162 par 48.
163 par 45. 
164 In this regard see The Department of Correctional Services v POPCRU (case no CA 6/2010 
(unreported) 27-09-2010 (LAC)) par 43; the Kyalami case (n 58) par 36; Weinrib “Constitutionalism 
in the age of rights – a prolegomenon” 2004 SALJ 278 286; Ngcobo “South Africa’s transformative 
constitution: towards an appropriate doctrine of separation of powers” 2011 Stell LR 37; Van 
der Walt “Constitution-making as a learning process: Andrew Arato’s model of post-sovereign 
constitution-making – editor’s introduction” 2010 SAJHR 1 13; Corder “Without deference, with 
respect: a response to justice O’Regan” 2004 SALJ 438 441-442; Blaau (n 1) 95; Moseneke (n 29) 348; 
Tamanaha (n 18) 102-105; and Beatty (n 63) 121-122.
165 The 36th Alfred and Winifred Hoernlé Memorial Lecture on 10-02-1993.
166 Goldstone “Do judges speak out?” 28 (http;//www.disa.ukzn.ac.za/webpages/DC/
boo/9930210.028.058/boo19930210.028.058.pdf) (25-02-2014).
167 See S v Dodo 2001 3 SA 382 (CC) par 41 and Glenister v President of the RSA 2009 1 SA 287 (CC) 
par 33. 
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that their rights and interests are capable of appropriate protection against the 
unreasonable and unjust exercise of public and private power. On the other hand, 
given that the judiciary is an independent unrepresented bench presided over by an 
array of judges drawn from diverse political backgrounds, each one a free-thinking 
autonomous individual with a particular jurisprudential point of reference,168 begs 
the question, who or what determines the extent and limitation, if any, to which 
judges are capable of exercising their reign? How do we deal with this “fear”? In 
what manner can legality impose self-restraint mechanisms? Dworkin contends that 
intellectual discipline, as opposed to political power, is a relevant factor informing 
an independent decision based on integrity which in turn is grounded upon matters 
of principle.169 Adjudication is consequently influenced by principled reasoning170 
and recognition of the principle of legality.171 Whether a court should intervene in 
the business and affairs of the elected branches of government is something that 
needs to be determined on a case-to-case basis.172 Courts are alive to the ambit of 
their business as guardians and are in fact reluctant to poke their judicious noses 
into the affairs and business that fall under the umbrella of the other branches 
of government.173 Realistically, there is a de facto consistent recognition of the 
separation of powers and the court being required to be persuaded to interfere with 
either of the other two arms of government.174 Significantly, a self-imposing restraint 
is section 41 which codifies the separation of powers, and which when read with 
section 165 of the constitution, delineates the judicial powers and restraints of the 
court. A judge executing her duty may be urged to exercise a Dworkinian “best 
interpretive approach”,175 but in doing so will no doubt be alive to the restraints 
imposed not only expressly by the terms of the constitution but the principle of 
legality which flows from the rule of law which recognises the importance of a 
separation of powers in a constitutional democracy.
4  Conclusion
Rule by law in terms of draconian legislation which expels judicial review of the 
exercise of governmental power through privative or ouster clauses is a legal reality 
to which the South African judicial and political system has borne witness. It is a 
reality to which many countries are currently held ransom. A system in terms of 
which courts function as institutions with deference to rightful functions entrusted 
to the executive and legislature by their representatives is a foundational cornerstone 
of any society that can lay claim to embrace the rule of law. If the embracement 
thereof is more readily achieved through a written than an unwritten constitution 
168 See O’Regan “From form to substance: the constitutional jurisprudence of Laurie Ackermann” in 
Barnard-Naude (n 39) 1-5. 
169 (n 57) 82-83. 
170 O’Regan (n 168) 16. 
171 O’Regan (n 168) 15.
172 the Glenister case (n 167) par 35. See also Du Bois “Rights trumped? Balancing in constitutional 
adjudication” in Du Bois (ed) The Practice of Integrity: Reflections on Ronald Dworkin and South 
African Law (2004) and 2004 Acta Juridica 155 164-166. 
173 the Fedsure case (n 41). See also Whittington et al (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Politics 
(2008) 110-116.
174 Beatty “Constitutional labour rights: pros and cons” 1993 ILJ 1 14 and Davis “Dworkin: a 
viable theory of adjudication for the South African constitutional democracy” in Du Bois (n 172) 
96 109-110. 
175 Roux “Transformative constitutionalism and the best interpretation of the South African constitution: 
distinction without a difference?” 2009 Stell LR 258 266. 
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falls outside the purview of this article. A crucial role played in the enforcement 
of the rule of law is the nature of judicial activism on the bench. To describe a 
judge as conservative, liberal or moderately liberal may be a self-defeating task. 
This is so, because, irrespective of the “label” one seeks to attach, the hope is 
that the judge will apply the best possible matured reasoned and enlightened and 
creative jurisprudential intellectual skills to the task at hand in unpacking the values 
comprising the rule of law.
An especially important value flowing from the rule of law is the principle of 
legality. This principle instils hope176 in the fact that our courts are able to deal 
with the exercise of all types of power and measure their integrity against the 
values and norms of the constitution, thereby making no case “too difficult”.177 
Employment of the principle of legality also enables the bench to dispel fears that 
they are improperly transcending the boundaries of their duties as watch-guards 
of our constitutional dispensation. It is clear that judges have enough of their own 
judicial work proper – their aim, whilst questioning and regulating the exercise of 
governmental power, is not to subsume the role of executive or legislative. Decisions 
handed down by our courts, which are also internationally recognized, contribute 
to the constant evolution of our rich common law which breathes jurisprudential 
life and sustenance into the values and norms used to interpret the ultimate law of 
our land, namely the constitution. In this regard, the flexibility and agility of the 
principle of legality is manifested. In as much as it operates to regulate conduct 
on the part of the other arms of government, by necessary implication, given its 
inexorable bond to the rule of law, it restrains the functions of our bench to do what 
they are required to do, namely ensure that the rights to human dignity, equality 
and freedom are not compromised by the undue exercise of all power. To believe 
that this will always be a harmonious exercise would be unwise.178 The challenge, 
however, in administrative law, is for our judges to rise to the occasion, as they 
have so often proven themselves capable of doing, and to continue to do, in order 
to write masterful judgments that will serve as classical masterpieces for the future 
development and sustenance of administrative law and its important reliance on the 
principle of legality.
SAMEVATTING
HEROORWEGING VAN DIE OPPERGESAG VAN DIE REG EN LEGALITEITSBEGINSEL: 
GEREGTELIKE ERGERNIS OF LISENSIE?
Die eenvoudige uitoefening van openbare en private mag hang af van wat redelik is. Proporsionaliteit 
en rasionaliteit moet as noodsaaklike bestanddele van redelikheid dien. Intrinsiek gekoppel aan 
voorgenoemde is die rol wat deur die oppergesag van die reg en die legaliteitsbeginsel vervul word, 
wat ’n onderdeel van die oppergesag van die reg is. As ’n fundamentele beginsel van grondwetlike reg, 
beperk die legaliteitsbeginsel die magte wat in die besonder deur die uitvoerende gesag en wetgewer 
uitgeoefen word op so ’n wyse dat hulle geen mag kan uitoefen behalwe wat aan hulle verleen is 
ingevolge die reg nie – om anders te handel, is om ultra vires op die tree. Administratiefreg en die 
hersiening van die uitoefening van mag maak op die legaliteitsbeginsel staat.
Artikel 33 van die 1996-grondwet verseker die reg op regverdige administratiewe optrede. Die 
Wet op die Bevordering van Administratiewe Geregtigheid 3 van 2000 gee gevolg daaraan. Die 
outeur redeneer dat konseptuele probleme en ingewikkeldhede van die Wet op die Bevordering van 
Administratiewe Geregtigheid meer gedoen het om hersieningsaansoeke kragtens die Wet op die 
Bevordering van Administratiewe Geregtigheid te benewel as inspireer, wat veroorsaak dat litigante, 
176 Stromseth (n 6) 310-312. 
177 Gearty and Mantouvalou Debating Social Rights (2011) 116-130. 
178 Cockrell “Rainbow jurisprudence” 1996 SAJHR 1 36-38.
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akademici en regters na die meer soepel en minder gekompliseerde regsmiddele wat aangebied kan 
word, kyk deur hulle op die legaliteitsbeginsel te beroep. Die doel van die artikel is om op die soepel 
aard van die legaliteitsbeginsel te fokus en die mate waarin dit in administratiefregtelike hersiening 
aangewend kan word. Indien egter onbehoorlik toegepas, betoog die outeur, kan dit ook gebruik word 
om die beginsel van subsidiêriteit te ondermyn.
Die outeur ondersoek sekere sake wat beklemtoon het dat nasionale wetgewing nie ontduik kan word 
nie en dat vertroue regstreeks in die grondwet geplaas word om regte af te dwing. Dit word herhaal 
deur die bepalings van die Wet op die Bevordering van Administratiewe Geregtigheid “ten uitvoer te 
bring”. Ten slotte ondersoek die artikel die moontlikheid van ruim balans, indien enige, wat tussen die 
elastisiteit wat deur die legaliteitsbeginsel gebied word en die vereiste om nie nasionale wetgewing te 
ignoreer nie, bereik kan word.
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